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BOOK REVIEWS
Eternal Life?: Life after Death as a Medical, Philosophical, and Theological
Problem, by Hans Kung. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1984. Pp. xvi, 272. Cloth, $15.95.
Reviewed by FREDERICK SONTAG, Pomona College.
A. Questions
For philosophers, good books raise as many questions as they answer. Such is
the case with Hans Kling's book on Eternal Life? Among the questions to be
considered are: (I) How does the book stand in a Roman Catholic context vs.
the Protestant appraisal offered here? (2) How should theology deal with the
question of eternal life? Like philosophy, theologians must always start with the
question: What is theology, and how should it proceed with its task? (3) How
much rehearsal of related material should one give vs. a direct attempt to offer
a systematic answer? (4) How bound should the theologian be to offer a contemporary solution to a traditional question, in such a way that it conforms to what
we recognize as a "traditional Christian" answer or doctrine? Kling's book is
multifaceted and raises more questions than it answers. Perhaps, of course, that
is what he intended by the question mark in the title.
Quoting a comment by Hermann Llibbe on Heinrich Heine, Kung states his
own theme and also the chief problem with the book: "The work of Heinrich
Heine enables us to see how religion survives its criticism and how piety can
be compatible with complete enlightenment." (p. 202) The Catholic tradition
was so long kept from the Enlightenment, that once Vatican II had "thrown open
the windows," led by Kung Roman Catholic theologians raced to catch up at
double speed. Kung says: "The meaning of Christian existence is not only God
and the divine, but also man himself, encompassing all that is human. Not only
heaven, but also earth and earthly happiness." (p. 176) Kling wants to stress
'self-realization' and 'self-development' like any good humanist. After stressing
aestheticism and spirituality and self-denial for centuries, this change is abrupt
to say the least.
Like some of his Protestant counterparts who began a century or two earlier,
Kling wants to endorse every humanistic, scientific goal of the modem world
and every traditional Catholic goal. After so many years of demanding an "oath
against modernism," the issue is: will oil and water mix'? Kung begins (p. xiii)
by saying that theologians are embarrassed by the question: "Do you believe in
life after death?" But the prior question is, "Why should they be'?" Saint Paul
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was clear that Christian assertions would be "foolishness to the Greeks." How
far, then, should theologians accept the strictures of conformity to secular
thought? The turning point of the modem age away from God toward human
beings, Kung tells us, "has to be taken seriously." (p. 60) True, but how seriously,
so much so that humanistic criteria set the limits for theological response? The
postulate of the Enlightenment has penetrated everywhere (Ibid.), but does that
mean that it must control religious affirmations?
Kung documents the fact that modem atheism "went hand in hand with the
utopia of earthly immortality" (p. 8) and also that our disillusionment over the
possibility of establishing such a utopia is now almost complete. The first portion
of his book is devoted to rehearsing recent medical experience with the dying
and documents the new medical willingness to consider evidence other than the
purely physical. (A-I) Kung rejects the "last minute" experience of the dying
as proof for life after death. Interesting as they may be, as far as 'proof' is
concerned he is probably right. Atheism always draws on Feuerbach, as Kung
points out, but the issue is how much we are now prepared to accept his shift
from God to man. Kung states that "the time of metaphysics is past" (p. 34),
which is rather ironic since his every page raises a question of 'first principles'
or basic assumptions. The rejection of metaphysics has become a modem dogma,
replacing theological dogma, because the modems thought science would yield
us the one true set of first principles. But since this has not been the case,
metaphysics resurfaces.
Kung shares the current fad of prefacing the consideration of every issue with
a brief excursion into comparative religions. (A-3) He also shares the happy
(Hegelian?) thought that religions are somehow today "open to a dialectical
reconciliation" (p. 60), all the while our history up to the present moment is one
of bitter infighting and warfare among religions. He considers 'reincarnation'
and then argues, like Kant, that "A truly moral world necessarily presupposes
the idea of a life after this life." (p. 62) That assertion, of course, does not stand
on its own but depends on what 'truly moral' means and what 'God' is like.
Kung ultimately sides with modem rationalism when he states "theology cannot
avoid the demand for verification of belief in eternity." (p. 73) There is to be
no intellectual sacrifice, he says. But what could 'verification' mean where belief
in eternity is concerned? He tells us that, even if belief in eternity cannot be
proved, "it can be shown to be well founded." (p. 75)
Kung proposes an "indirect verification criterion." (p. 76) But his explanation
of what this means dissolves into jargon and is little likely to please the verification
philosophers he claims to want to satisfy. He wants eternal life to be an absolutely
reasonable trust rooted in reality, similar to love. (p. 78) But we must reply that
many reasonable trusts and many loves prove ultimately futile. Kung recognized
that Jesus' outlook was clearly apocalyptical. He demythologizes this by saying
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that Jesus was "mistaken" (p. 92) and the apocalyptic horizon cannot be revived
today. At this point it is clear that Kling accepts certain fonus of modem
metaphysics as dominant over the way in which Scripture and traditional beliefs
can be accepted. Likewise, he claims the Easter testimonies are meant not as
evidence for an event but as testimonies "to the risen one as person" (p. 100),
whatever that can mean.
The Easter stories "make concrete and defend the reality of the new life of
the risen Christ." (p. 103) Kling believes in the "truth of Easter," he says,
"without having to accept as literally true each and every one of the Easter
stories" (Ibid.), which certainly leaves Kling free to pick and choose. The resurrection "is not a historical but nevertheless a real event." (p. 105) He continues:
"The resurrection is not an event in space and time. It is not a miracle, breaking
through the laws of nature ... " (Ibid.) It is a miracle of the new creation of life
out of death, he concludes. Kung speaks of a "wholly new mode of existence."
But if there is no miracle, how does new life emerge? This is more of a mystery
than a physical resurrection. "The miracle is the new creation of life out of
death," Kling reports (Ibid.), but how does this transpire? "Jesus lives again
through God" (p. 106), he says, but how?
If "the Crucified lives forever with God" (p. 107), how does this differ from
Process Theology's notion of our absorption into the divine process? "Death is
a passing into God" (p. 113); it means a wholly new relationship. But what of
the continuance of personal identity and individuality? Belief in the resurrection
"means taking up the side of life" (p. 116), Kling says in an echo of the Social
Gospel. He is next diverted into an inquiry into the meaning of "descended into
hell," which is important to traditional creeds but hardly central to the issue of
resurrection. Kling again resorts to demythologizing and tells us we may believe
in Christ without having to accept his "time-conditioned apocalyptic world view."
(p. 140) But what criterion lets us pick and choose the parts of traditional belief
we will accept and what we will reject? Some contemporary world view? Kling
does not establish this.

B. Confessions
Kung hedges his conclusion by saying, "There is nothing to be known here,
but everything to be hoped." (p. 141) But if our ability to conclude is so limited,
why exclude any traditional belief on the grounds of incredibility? He returns
to his modernism: "We are asking about an ultimate ... reality in which we of the
twentieth-century can believe and in which we can trost." (p. 143) The heaven
of faith is not heaven in a physical sense: 'The heaven of faith is not a place
but a mode of being." (p. 144) It is the hidden, invisible sphere of God, we are
told. Heaven is the future of the world and man which is God himself, Kling
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concludes. But does this mean we are all absorbed into the divine life in a final
pantheism? On the basis of modem credibility, is such a romantic notion any
more credible, really, than a physical heaven or a literal resurrection? Why?
Halfway through the book, one is struck by a startling fact: Dr Kung has not
been struggling with the great weight of the Roman Catholic tradition, except
possibly for a brief side trip into hell. No papal encyclicals are cited, few Councils
are mentioned. Those whom he quotes or struggles with are a cross section of
primarily contemporary or recent intellectual figures, mostly non-Catholic and
in some cases non-Christian. To note this is not to try to condemn Catholic
theologians to a ghetto existence again. But it is interesting how noticeable is
the absence of any struggle with the great weight of the Roman Church and its
tradition. This is not said to prejudge how theologians, Roman or otherwise,
should proceed or how they should select their sources. But it does underline
the opening statement of this review that the book raises many questions. How,
then, should a Roman Catholic theologian proceed to treat a dogmatic question
in relation to the church's teaching and tradition?
Kung takes an excursion into medical ethics in Chapter VII and then relates
belief in eternal life with our acceptance of death. "If there is this eternal life
in God, a new approach to dying is possible." (p. 164) Kung denies that he can
support any "definitive, irreformable doctrine." (p. 170) Following the route of
the philosophers, he puts forward for our reflection "a few justifiable questions."
It would seem that Kung wants to endorse every humanistic, scientific goal of
the modem world and all traditional Roman Catholic goals-a large order. "Not
only heaven but also earth and earthly happiness. Not only 'to know God" ... but
also self-realization, self-development, humanization." (pp. 176-77) He acknowledges that "for the first time a generation is growing up in Germany which can
no longer be regarded as a part of Christian society. (p. 189) Yet he somehow
does not see this as connected to the increasing secularization of society and the
pursuit of secular goals.
Kung again embraces every humanistic value and yet somehow sees it as
"Christian" at the same time: "We are on earth to live on earth and that means
here and now to live in a human, in a truly human, a Christian way." (p. 197)
That is the issue: Are the two as compatible as Kung would like them to be?
He bases his hope for eternal life on a love of life here. Because we experience
happiness here, he says, we hope for a continuation of happiness in heaven. (p.
198) Heaven based on earth, not earth on heaven. "Hope of heaven must be
rooted in earth if it is to remain human." (p. 200) This world, Kung insists,
"has an ultimate uncontrollable meaning not derived from itself." (p. 208) Possibly, but certainly this cannot be supported by the demands for 'proof' which
Kung insisted on earlier. He concludes: "The ambiguity of life and all that is
negative are overcome definitively only by God himself." (p. 211)

82

Faith and Philosophy

That may be, but has Kung provided a basis for such hope, which he impulsively
proclaims, by his earlier insistence on humanistic and scientific foundations?
Has his analysis left God without the transcendent power necessary to accomplish
such a hope? Kung clearly wants "both/and." He wants to leave salvation open
to all and yet warn everyone that salvation is not guaranteed. The Last Judgment
is for him not the ultimate reality but "God's kingdom is the consummation,"
(p. 213)-whatever that can mean. It will come, he tells us, through God's
"unforeseeable, unextrapolatable action" (Ibid.)-surely a dark phrase. "In the
consummation of man and the world it is a question of a new life in the nonvisual
dimensions of God beyond our time and our space," (p. 220) Kung reports in
an expansive bit of mysticism. But he advises us: "We are not required to cope
intellectually with the problem ... of eternal life" (p. 222), thus letting us off the
hook.
Kung ends in a burst of pragmatism: "What matters is to work together with
others who are living with us ... for a practical life at the present time ... " (Ibid.)
But he reverses himself and closes "with a plea for a belief in an eternal life ... "
(Ibid.) But why does he, and what basis has he provided? He says: "This is a
certainty of the future" (p. 223), evidently a kind of ultimate fideism. What is
the point of all the rationalizing and posturing about science, then'? "Natural
science cannot give this answer about the ultimate meaning, only an-absolutely
reasonable--trust can do this." (p. 226) But what can this "reasonable" mean'?
We are left with the "great mixture of reality ... , which cannot be grasped by
any concept, cannot be fully expressed by any statement." (pp. 227-28) If so,
why not note that mystery at the beginning and be done with it?
Kung does not leave it there. He goes back to speak of a "realistic enlightenment," "a purified, responsible religion." (p. 229) Is this a return to the 'natural
religion' of the Enlightenment, which Hume rejected, after having just pronounced it all an ultimate mystery? Which is it to be, Dr. Kung? He says: "If
I believe in an eternal life, I know this world is not the ultimate reality." (p.
232) Then its standards need not govern our judgments. One can only see Kung's
conclusions as a burst of inconsistencies, an attempt to put all sides together by
means of words, to have the world and every secular hope and heaven too. Kung
wants 'reasonable,' 'justifiable' conclusions and yet he endorses an ultimate
mystery. The humanism of Enlightenment should force him to give up eternal
life. But he cannot, so he proclaims it in a burst of proclamations.
C. Martin Luther Kiing?
Martin Luther was a Roman Catholic seminary professor who also came to
hold views at odds with his hierarchy. Is Hans Kung likely to be forced out of
his church and then "Kungianism" become a new world-wide religious move-
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ment? Hardly. The monolithic nature of the Roman church has been broken.
More important, the ways of the Roman church today are less militant and more
flexible. There is room for pluralism within the church. Ironically, Martin Luther
was far more conservative theologically than Hans Kung.
In ages to come will Hans Kung find that his views, like Luther's, are accepted
as commonplace? In Hans Kung's case, the issue is not so simple. Luther pressed
for reforms he felt would liberate the church from aberrations in its practice.
Kung appeals to standards of truth more akin to the Enlightenment which are
outside the notion of how change takes place by an ecumenical council such as
Vatican II. How shall the Roman church engage in discussions and decide on
reforms in its practice and its doctrine? That is the question which Kung raises
for Catholic theologians.
Here lies the issue: Are church decisions to be made individually by reflection,
by scholarly exploration and by mutual dialogue with other interested persons,
clerical or lay? Martin Luther never came close to endorsing such a spirit of
individualism in doctrine, as the ultra conservative position of the church that
bears his name indicates. But the Enlightenment believes firmly in individual
reflection and public debate, and it uses the tools of modem scholarship as an
unquestioned standard of evaluation.
How can two parties who are so far apart ever reconcile their differences,
particularly if they disagree about the stage on which the debate is to take place
and if each holds different views on how truth in religion is to be determined?
Hans Kung is the child of the Enlightenment and of several centuries of Protestantism rapidly distilled. The Pope, the Cardinals, the Curia, and the Bishops
are the upholders of an ancient tradition which, right or wrong, does not see
itself as changed by public debate. The symposium of Plato is not their forum,
and the method of dialogue does not seem to be the way to truth.
Hans Kung's spiritual home is not even with Martin Luther but with Liberal
Protestantism. Luther was a biblically based conservative, but I hear no echo of
"sola scriptura" in Kung's statements. Yet even if dialogue does establish truth
and is the preferred means for philosophical reflection, is it an avenue which
large hierarchical churches should use, or even can use, to determine doctrine?
We in America cheer the individual who is strong enough to stand up to authority
and assert his own position. This is democracy. But the Roman church is not a
democratic institution, and it is not likely ever to become one.
To what standard for determining truth in doctrine does Professor Kung appeal?
It is easy to establish a wide variety of individual beliefs. These emerge in every
professor's classroom everyday. But how are official changes in institutions and
their doctrines brought about? This is a particularly thorny issue if the institution
and the challenger do not accept the same means to determine truth. And what
is the role of the individual theologian-teacher in this process? I know many
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who think we professors decide the truth of religion in the classroom. But there
are more graduates of those classrooms who know that "in the real world"
institutional change is not so easily brought about by individual intellectual
debate. In most churches practical-minded clergy control the reins of power, not
professors.
Nevertheless, can university professors become so powerful that they can
induce institutional change? Plato wanted philosophers to become kings in order
to overcome this split between the yogi and the commissar. Surely Hans Kiing
must ask himself this question. Should theology professors become popes or
should popes become revisionary theologians? To accomplish doctrinal and
institutional change it is not enough to publish books or even to travel on the
lecture circuit. That has been done before. Quakers, Congregationalists, and
Baptists have long worked out doctrinal truth each for himself or herself. But
is that avenue open to a Roman Catholic even in this day?

Metaphysics: Constructing a World View, by William Hasker. Downers Grove,
IL: Inter Varsity Press, 1983, pp. 132. Paper, $4.95.

Reviewed by THOMAS V. MORRIS, University of Notre Dame.
Like many of the readers of this journal, I regularly initiate undergraduates
into the ways of philosophy. My introductory lecture course begins with a couple
of weeks on the nature of rational belief, moves on into some of the classic
problems of metaphysics, and culminates in an examination of some questions
central to the philosophy of religion. In the past, I have used the most recent
edition of Richard Taylor's Metaphysics (Prentice Hall) to cover the second
segment of the course. The next time around, I plan to use this new little book
by Hasker instead. Although he covers a narrower range of issues than Taylor,
the simplicity and clarity of Hasker's exposition, as well as the general accessibility of his argumentation to philosophical novices, in my opinion make Hasker's
book preferable to Taylor's for this sort of context. Moreover, this is a book
which can hold the attention of the non-philosophical reader, the average student
as well as the intelligent layperson. It employs to great effect various pedagogical
devices, such as well chosen quotations and illuminating illustrations, often with
a touch of humor. All in all, it succeeds in its appointed task admirably well.
What that task is should be made clear. Metaphysics is the second volume to
have appeared in the new Contours of Christian Philosophy series edited by C.
Stephen Evans of St. Olaf College and published by a popular, evangelical
Christian press. The, books in this series are to be short, introductory level texts,

